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INTRODUCTION
JmiEsoN B. FORDEAM t
The extraordinary difficulties which characterize the human con-
dition in 1968 present an unmatched challenge to the mind and spirit.
This is conspicuously the case with the men and women of the law
upon whose ministry of the law, as both a stabilizing and energizing
influence, so very much depends.
We could, if we would, make the occasion one for much pomp
and ceremony, and engage in no end of celebration. For is not 1968
International Human Rights Year? Is it not the centennial of the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment? The blunt answer is that
this is no time for easy ceremonial. The problems of society are too
great, too urgent. The call is for hard commitment and action, not
embellished lip service. The challenge is to the human spirit. Do
we have the qualities of heart to make ours a truly just society? It is
a time for soul-searching about human rights and social responsibility,
a time for massive action.
The papers in the symposium to which these brief remarks are
introductory give thoughtful attention to a number of problems affect-
ing human rights. The introduction itself is a general one. The
principal authors surely speak for themselves. The introducer essays
a broader stance.
It seems fair to say that the fourteenth amendment-combined
with the safeguards for the individual against state action which were
written into the Federal Constitution in 1787-has become a Bill of
Rights for the states. I will not engage in the exercise of cataloguing
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the protections of the first eight amendments which have been made
effective against state action through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The protection against state action is now
almost as extensive as that against action by the national government.
There have been notable developments in recent years, including
recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination in the state
sphere and application to the states of the guaranty of a right to a
speedy trial in criminal cases. Significant developments, applicable in
principle to both federal and state action, have taken place in the state
framework.
Nor does it appear profitable to pursue the debate over "incor-
poration" as against the theory that the fundamental fairness exacted
by fourteenth amendment due process may assure some of the sub-
stantive and procedural rights safeguarded by the first eight amend-
ments. In principle I favor the latter theory. Incorporation could
have been rationalized in terms of privileges and immunities of United
States citizenship protected by the fourteenth amendment, but that
course was blocked in the Slaughter-House Cases.' The question is
still pursued in Supreme Court opinions,2 but what has come about,
cumulatively, is something amounting to piecemeal incorporation of
very nearly the "whole works." We have seen state action cases decided
not simply on broad principles recognized by one of the first eight
amendments, but in terms of interpretation of the language of those
amendments. Thus it has been with the establishment clause of the
first amendment.
So, in 1968, we have a Federal Bill of Rights limiting state
action, brought into being largely by extrapolation from fourteenth
amendment due process.
The theoretical case for a Bill of Rights is stronger at the state
than at the national level because of the plenary character of state
power as contrasted with the delegated nature of federal power. And
each state, of course, has its own bill or declaration of rights. Histor-
ically, such state provisions have not proved very effective. It is hard
to believe that fourteenth amendment development through federal
court interpretation is unrelated to this; the federal courts have, in a
very real sense, been filling a gap. The unevenness of state safeguards,
particularly as interpreted by the courts of the several states, contrasts
with the more exacting national limitations authoritatively interpreted
by one highest court.
183 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
2 See the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213, 226-27 (1967).
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This is a period of considerable-but far from pervasive and
compelling-interest in state constitutional revision. There has been
no serious thought of discarding state bills or declarations of rights.
Some changes calculated to strengthen the safeguards have been made
and it is clear that a state may cover ground not fully occupied by
federal limitations. All things considered, one is moved to say it is
good that state constitutional safeguards of individual rights are being
retained and strengthened.
It is familiar learning that, in contrast to the extensive resort to
the process of amendment in state constitutional development, the
evolution of our national constitutional law has come about largely
through responsible interpretation, in part through the initiative of
the executive and legislative branches, but in larger and more nearly
definitive part by judicial exegesis. What has been said about a
Federal Bill of Rights for the states speaks to this point. The judicial
role which has been played in the national framework has fascinating
implications, which go beyond the basic safeguarding of human rights.
They relate to the fundamental political elements in American society.
They bear upon the distribution of responsibility for decision-making
as between the courts and the political branches and as between the
national union and the states.
Consider the one-man, one-vote decisions of the Supreme Court
with respect to state government. Representation in many state legis-
latures had become uneven, often without rational basis. This con-
dition had continued for a long time, unrelieved by substantial cor-
rective action through political processes. The major corrective action
came, as we know, through a series of Supreme Court decisions, which
put the matter under the equal protection clause. I am one who thinks
that this is a very good thing as a matter of policy, but I have yet
to find solid basis for the one-man, one-vote principle in the fourteenth
amendment, viewed as a whole,3 or in the perspective of American
experience with representation in legislative bodies.
What we have in this development is a rather extraordinary in-
stance of judicial attack upon a bad political situation. The assertion
of the individual voter's right to equal protection of the laws is the
channel through which, by judicial action, the pattern of representation
in a legislature is redrawn. In other words, the central policy-making
arm of state government is changed by court action in a way to affect
everyone in the state in order to accord voter Jones equal protection.
I am tempted to draw a limited sort of generalization from this to the
3 See Fordham, Judicial Policy-M kin# at Legislative Expense, 34 GMo. WASHE.
L. REv. 829, 831-35 (1966).
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effect that there is a tendency in our system to look to the courts when
the political branches fail in their own spheres. A closely associated
point is that the legal profession is a critical factor in this process.
Obviously, it must be the lawyer who will press for results in the
judicial forum when recourse to the legislature has not been fruitful.
Constitutional evolution through interpretation, of course, has
depended upon access to the courts. Where the line of access has been
through attack upon federal expenditures, it has long been the assump-
tion, based upon Frothingham v. Mellon,4 that the taxpayer lacks stand-
ing to question in court the legality of a federal expenditure from the
general fund of the treasury. In view of the readiness of courts to
allow taxpayers to make such challenges at the state and local levels,
it is hard to believe that the jurisdictional argument is a very serious
one.' While there was talk in Frothinglum about lack of jurisdiction,
there was also stress on insubstantiality and remoteness of interest. To
say that as a constitutional matter there would not be a case or
controversy under article III seems remote in itself.
It is of interest that in a 1967 one-man, one-vote case from Florida
the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the standing of Dade County
voters who were attacking legislative apportionment even though it
was conceded that voters in that county had received constitutional
treatment under the legislative plan.' The Court allowed the voters to
pursue their challenge as representatives of other citizens of the state.
With respect to first amendment clauses relating to religion, the
matter of standing has been under consideration in the Congress and
is before the Supreme Court at the present time. Senator Ervin's bill
was passed by the Senate last year.7 The pending case is a taxpayer's
suit arising in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York, in which a three-judge court, with one judge dissenting,
ruled that the taxpayers were without standing to challenge the use
of federal funds to aid church-affiliated schools.'
4 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
5 See Committee on Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Proposed Legislation for Judicial Review of Constitutionality of Grants
and Loans Under Certain Acts, 22 REcoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 35 (1967).
6 Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 443 (1967).
7S. 3, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) :
Individual and corporate Federal taxpayers, or groups thereof; . . . and ...
citizens of the United States [shall have] "standing to sue" in litigation which
qualifies as a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article III of the
Constitution of the United States.
8 Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1, prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 895 (1967). On
June 10, 1968, the Supreme Court reversed and granted Mrs. Flast standing to sue.
Flast v. Cohen, 36 U.S.L.W. 4601 (June 10, 1968).
A state case involving public textbook aid to church-affiliated schools has just been
decided by the High Court. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 281 N.Y.S.2d
799, 228 N.E.2d 791 (1967), aff'd, 36 U.S.L.W. 4538 (June 10, 1968).
INTRODUCTION
Freedom of Expression-Academic Freedom
One of the most interesting and inspiring things in this country
today is the emergence of the younger generation as a great moral and
social force. (This statement is by way of welcoming the younger
ones into the arena and not of renouncing their elders' responsibility.)
There is nothing in our experience quite like the powerful force for
good that lies in the concern of young people of this day for integrity
and social justice in American life. The hippies express grounded
criticism of weaknesses in society by withdrawal. They are a very
small minority in comparison with the host of young men and women
in and out of college who are strongly committed to positive action
through orderly, democratic processes.
Let me cite an example of the quality of student thought and
action. In June, 1963, the General Assembly of North Carolina with-
out committee consideration and with less than twenty minutes of
floor debate in both houses adopted a so-called "gag" statute imposing
restrictions upon speaking by persons of certain classes on campuses of
state-supported institutions of higher education. The text of this
monstrosity is reproduced in the margin.9 It will be noted that the
statute had no internal sanction. The protest from the affected educa-
tional institutions and from other sources resulted, in 1965, in a soften-
ing of the statute."0 Student leaders at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill had been among the articulate, responsible voices of
protest. At a large meeting at the University in February, 1966, co-
9 Law of June 26, 1963, ch. 1207, [1963] N.C. Laws 1688:
Section 1. No college or university, which receives any State funds in
support thereof, shall permit any person to use the facilities of such college or
university for speaking purposes, who:
(A) Is a known member of the Communist Party;
(B) Is known to advocate the overthrow of the Constitution of the
United States or the State of North Carolina;
(C) Has pleaded the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States in refusing to answer any question, with respect
to Communist or subversive connections, or activities, before any
duly constituted legislative committee, any judicial tribunal, or
the executive or administrative board of the United States or
any state.
Section 2. This Act shall be enforced by the board of trustees, or other
governing authority, of such college or university, or by such administrative
personnel as may be appointed therefor by the board of trustees or other gov-
erning authority of such college or university.
Section 3. All laws and clauses of laws in conflict with this Act are
hereby repealed.
10 N.C. Laws Extra Sess. 1965, ch. 1. The first paragraph of the act now reads:
The board of trustees of each college or university which receives any
state funds in support thereof, shall adopt and publish regulations governing
the use of facilities of such college or university for speaking purposes by any
person who:
N.C. Gnzx. STAT. § 116-199 (1966).
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sponsored by students, their leaders took a strong and dignified stand
against regulations proposed by the administration which provided for
administrative censorship of speaking appearances on the campus by
student-invited speakers. The protest was unavailing.
Thereafter the student leaders joined in a suit in federal court
attacking the statute and regulations as infringements upon freedom
of speech. In February, 1968, a three-judge district court sustained
the attack." This landmark ruling makes one recall with warm
appreciation the wish of one-time University President Edwin Alder-
man that, at Chapel Hill, there would always be a breath of freedom
in the air.
It is appropriate to note several very active current problem areas.
Civil Disobedience
Patently, it may be in order to disobey a law for the purpose of
laying the basis for a challenge to its constitutionality. The most
likely situations today are those involving (1) laws affecting equality
of opportunity and social justice and (2) laws providing for military
conscription viewed in relation to a particular war.
Obviously, in either type of case, the individual may disobey on
moral grounds and face the consequences. But how can he rationalize
subordinating the statute to some higher law not embodied in the
constitution itself? Put somewhat differently, in order to prevail in
his attack upon the statute, must not the individual persuade the court
that the moral element inheres in some identifiable constitutional
limitation?
This question is very much with us because the conditions of our
society and various commitments of public policy challenge the moral
values of many people.
Welfare Rights
Are there constitutional rights to particular public services or
benefits? Clearly enough one may challenge effectively discriminatory
treatment under a welfare program which the government chooses to
provide. Several courts have recently held that a one-year residence
requirement for eligibility for public assistance is an unreasonable
classification and does not meet the test of the equal protection clause.Y
"1 Dickson v. Sitterson, 36 U.S.L.W. 2555 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 1968).
12E.g., Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967), prob. juris. noted,
88 S. Ct. 1054 (March 4, 1968) (No. 1138) ; Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331
(D. Conn. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 1032 (1968) (No. 813).
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It is being urged that there are substantive rights to governmental
benefits, which are beyond discretion of government. One might claim
a right to shelter, food, water, medical care and one or more municipal-
type services, such as garbage collection and removal. The contention
would be made, of course, by persons unable to pay for such services.
The claim could not be made across the board; in one way or another
someone has to pay.
Here again, we see citizens taking major problems of social policy
to the courts. This has troublesome implications from the standpoint
of the roles of the judicial and legislative branches and is rife with
questions concerning effective judicial administration of the principles
involved.
Judicial recognition of a right to governmental services (and a
correlative obligation of government to provide them) would spread
ripples clear across the pond of public business. Public activities and
outlay therefore are relative and interrelated; what would be required
by higher authority as to one service would condition to some extent
what could or would be done as to others. In a given community the
claimed service may have been left in the private sector, but the response
to this would be that government would have to buy it for the individual.
Doubtless more fundamental is the question whether political
morality and the cause of social justice can be advanced in this way.
There are rather deep-running questions of how best to change
community values and outlook, and to nurture strong and responsive
representative policy-making institutions. How much can we achieve
through judicial mandate? The one-man, one-vote decisions do not
teach us very much here: they give expression to something that had
great public support and, in any event, it remains to be seen how much
we are gaining in the quality of state legislative institutions.
Religious Liberty
The focus of attention here has moved from religious practices in
the public schools to governmental aid to church-related schools. Cases
involving state and federal aid are now pending in the Supreme Court.Y
3
The extent, if any, to which such aid can be squared with the establish-
ment clause is a question of great educational importance. Parochial
schools are a very substantial factor in the total educational effort in
many communities. From the perspective of educational policy they
must be taken into account. They have, for example, a significant
13 On June 10, 1968, the Court sustained against constitutional challenge N.Y.
EDTJc. LAw § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1967), allowing school boards to purchase and
lend textbooks to children attending parochial schools. Board of Educ. v. Allen,
36 U.S.L.W. 4538 (June 10, 1968). See note 8 supra.
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potential for racial integration. What can we do by way of public
financial support consistently with separation of church and state?
There is no doubt that the gap between the basic promise of our
fundamental political documents and judicial and legislative recognition
and fulfillment has been greatly narrowed in recent years. We have
gone far toward adequate legal recognition of human rights. Current
enactment of federal fair housing legislation, 4 and current judicial
revivification of a centuries-old statute,'5 are notable measures on
behalf of equality of opportunity. These gains are not to be dis-
counted. What must be said is that we yet have a very long way to
go in closing the gap between legal recognition of human rights and
genuine fulfillment in the actualities of life.
Politically and governmentally there is need of stronger and more
responsive legislative institutions to deal in a positive way with social
ills. More basic than that is the elevation of the spirit of the citizenry.
There is a special burden on the white citizenry to break the old and
ugly bonds of prejudice. Genuine acceptance of their non-white
brothers is of prime importance. If that is achieved we shall be on
a sound footing in pursuing long-range social and economic goals.
14 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-901 (April 11, 1968).
15 jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 36 U.S.L.W. 4661 (June 17, 1968). It is per-
haps notable, in terms of the importance of state and local responsibility in this area,
that the Attorneys General of three states filed briefs supporting the petitioners.
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